The "can't buy me love" principle and others

Over at The Volokh Conspiracy, Orin Kerr has some observations that reflect the expectations that many of today's new associates have about law firms, especially large law firms:

Most of my knowledge of law firm life is second-hand, so my own take on this is sheer speculation. But I wonder if the article is missing a better explanation for the shift: law school graduates today understand that law firms — particularly large firms — are businesses. Law firms hire associates to make money, not for the esprit de corps. Big firm partners want to maximize their profits, and hiring lots of associates and having them bill lots of hours with little hope of making partner is a way to do that. Partners who have created this sort of environment are in an odd position to complain that today's young associates lack loyalty and don't volunteer for committee work. …

Prof. Kerr's notes that his observations (like most of mine) are based on hearsay. There are also comments to his post and elsewhere that suggest that the National Law Journal article that started this conversation just reflects a few voices in practice and not a general trend.

This is still a worthwhile discussion even if the trend is an illusion, if only to drive home a few key points.

• First, firms that do not treat their associates as long term investments should not expect much emotional commitment from those associates. (If a firm's business model depends on overstocking associates, it can make a rational business decision to keep on doing so. But it's probably a less ideal place to work.)
• Second, the first principle applies regardless of how much money the firm offers to associates. You can call this the "can't buy me love" principle. Paying high (excessive?) salaries only goes so far. As Reed Smith fifth-year associate Alicia Powell said, "After you make so much money, it's enough." I suspect more good attorneys will choose firms with somewhat lower salaries if they offer better opportunities for professional development and a personal life outside of the office. There are economic terms for this sort of tradeoff, but I'll leave those to the experts.
• Third, the impact of the first principle is even greater if a firm has abusive supervisors or otherwise engages in corporate hazing. Firms with bad supervisory techniques ought to expect broad decreases in morale and that similarly-situated employees will sympathize with each other more than with management. In many respects, this is an entirely different problem, but still it creates a great decrease in an employee's commitment to the firm.

You may have noticed that bad supervision techniques and law firm morale are pet issues of mine. They are, and that's the case no matter the size of the firm. I've seen small firms that have had great potential but completely missed the boat on retaining good associates because someone with supervisory authority couldn't contain a foul temper. That causes turnover and all of the costs that come with it. Other attorneys and staff suffer from the pain of transition, and the clients suffer because they lose the benefit of associates familiar with the issues in their cases and projects. If I read too much into the comment of the managing partner that Leigh Jones included in her NLJ article, it's because I think that issue is important and too often overlooked.